Ford Pinto Cost Benefit Analysis

The moral issues about the Ford Pinto is that they take their profit is more important than human life. They also did not inform the consumer about the facts of the Pinto. Lastly, they also lobbied the safety of the car to lowest standard (Shaw, Barry & Sansbury 2009, pp 97-99).

You have to consider the Ford Motor Company’s reputation after they made the decision to not recall the Ford Pinto to

6. What responsibilities to its customers do you think Ford had? What are the most important moral rights, if any, operating in the Pinto case?

Ford convinced NHTSA that cost/benefit analysis would be appropriate for determining not to change the fuel tank. The costs were eleven dollars per fuel tank to change which ended up equaling 137.5 million dollars. This number is very large and much bigger than the benefit if they would have not changed it, which was 49.5 million dollars.

There are many different cases where people have been critically injured or have died from burn-related injuries from the ruptured the Pino gas tank. This case study specifically discusses the 1978 untimely deaths of Lynn Marie Ulrich, Dana Ulrich, and Judy Ann. Between 1971 and 1978, the Pinto was responsible for a number of fire-related deaths. It was the death of these teenagers that lead brought the controversy of the Ford Pinto’s faulty gas tank placement to a climax resulting in criminal homicide charges for the automaker. Ford’s CEO Henry Ford II and Ford’s new president Lee Iacocca were responsible for the launch of the Ford Pinto. To stay ahead of the growing competition, The Pinto was not to weigh over 2,000 pounds and not costs not to exceed $2,000. Ford officials knew that the Pinto represented a serious fire issue when struck from the rear, but were desperate to expedite the vehicle’s release, the Pintos timing was set just under 25 months. Tooling has already been kicked off, so when crash tests revealed a serious defect in the gas tank, it was too late for any design modifications. The tooling was well underway. Therefore, Ford’s president decided it would be too costly to make changes in the Pinto’s gas tank location pushing ahead with the original design which went unchanged for six years. Any changes to the low-cost Ford Pinto would result in an increased price, thus possibly making it less desirable by small car buyers. Iacocca understood that people shopping for compact cars were watching every dollar, One Ford engineer explained, “the process of elasticity on these subcompacts is extremely tight. You can price yourself right out of the market by adding $25 to the production cost of the model”.

There are a few concerns about harmful behavior of the FMC that should be discussed. A behavior is harmful when it wrongfully sets back the interest of others and has a high risk of harm. Obviously, the gravity of harm in this case is very high being that it is life threatening. Once a consumer has purchased the Pinto and drives it off the lot he is at risk to getting rear ended, and burned to death by a car fire or explosion. Since the weight of this harm is very severe, the low probability of the consumer having an accident doesn’t discount Ford’s unethical behavior. Indeed, driving a Ford Pinto would place a consumer’s life at risk. Also at stake are the interests of Pinto passengers and drivers of other vehicles who certainly are not willing to risk their lives so Ford can make an extra buck. Everyone has an interest in not getting injured or killed. Setting back the interest of consumers isn’t the only thing Ford Motor Company was responsible for.

Ford executives were under a great deal of pressure to produce a smaller, more gas efficient automobile. Japanese and German automobile sales were rapidly increasing. These competitive forces drove Ford’s executive team to respond by rushing the design process of the Ford Pinto. By 1973, the Pinto was well into production when engineers discovered a flaw in the gas tank, which was located just under the rear bumper. They discovered that if the vehicle suffered a rear-end collision over 20 mph, the gas tank could break and spill gasoline into the passenger compartment, potentially resulting in a fire. The remedy for the flaw was a part that cost $11.00 per vehicle. Executives at Ford knew the company had followed all safety standards and regulations. At that time, automobile safety standards only needed gas tanks to withstand a collision under 20 mph. An internal cost-benefit analysis revealed the costs would be substantially higher to fix the design flaw that the costs associated with any potential damages due to collisions and loss of life. The public remained unaware until Mother Jones journalist, Mark Dowie broke the story in 1977. Fueled by the media, what followed was a frenzy of public outcry and court trials.

The Elkhart County Grand Jury took up the matter and filed a charge of criminal homicide against Ford, the Automobile American Corporation that designed the Pinto car models. According to Elkhart County Grand prosecutor, Michael A. Cosentino, Ford was guilty of reckless homicide, because the company committed a conscious, plain, and unjustifiable neglect of harm that positioned the gas tank in the rear end of the car without proven protection. Besides, Ford engaged in negligence and substantial deviation from the acceptable standards of conduct. The major focus of the case entailed the expanding and assessment of acceptable standards the company violated in the process of manufacture of Pinto cars.

If placed in the position of jurors who heard the arguments of 1978, personal consideration would have included benefit and harm, instead of relying on the cost/benefit analysis. Investigation conducted by the prosecution discovered that the engineers for Ford had knowledge of the defect during pre-production crash testing. Contrary to practicing ethically halting production to correct the defect, the automobile manufacturer indicated making changes to the tool design were not cost effective; essentially placing a dollar value on human existence. Ford motors appeared to be concerned with the cost and amount of time necessary to fix problem; rather than the lives lost or people permanently affected by the burning vehicle.

After analyzing the cause of the crash, experts identified that there were significant design deficiencies of the Pinto made by Ford Motor Company and the company was knowledgeable of these deficiencies before launching it into the market for

In April 2000, Ford Motor Co. announced a shareholder Value Enhancement Plan (VEP) to significantly recapitalize the firm's ownership structure. Ford had accumulated $23 billion in cash reserves and under the VEP would return as much as $10 billion of this cash to shareholders. In exchange for each share currently held, the plan would give stockholders one new share plus the choice of receiving $20 in either cash or additional new Ford common shares. Shareholders electing to receive cash would be taxed on these distributions at capital gain rates. Among other things, the plan provided a means for the Ford family to obtain liquidity without having to dilute their 40% voting interest (even though they own

The means were limited design time and reducing costs. By cutting costs, Ford knowingly created a product which could prove dangerous and fatal to its consumers. Does Ford’s ends justify its means? Ford did create a sub-compact that sold extremely well and competed fiercely with foreign imports. The goal of the Ford Pinto was met. The costs of this win were substantial however. The money that Ford tried to save by not recalling the vehicle was spent when Ford recalled the Pinto, and extra was spent in compensatory and punitive damages in lawsuits. So the costs that Ford tried to avoid were incurred anyway along with extra.

I think Pinto case raised some serious issue of abusing human rights and not behaving ethically in the world of business. Any business/service should never ever put a value on human life and not take consideration of a known deadly danger. Ford had an option as well as the solution to design the car in a way that prevented cars from exploding; however they refused to implement it.   They thought that it was cost effective not to fix dangerous condition than to spend the money to save people in spite of the fact that the only added cost was $ 11 per vehicle.

Ford was not in violation of the law in any way and had to make the decision whether to incur a cost to fix the obvious problem internally. There were several options for the fuel system redesign. The option most seriously considered would have cost Ford an additional $11 per vehicle. Under the strict $2000 budget restriction, even this nominal cost seemed large. In addition, Ford had earlier based an advertising campaign on safety, which failed miserably. Therefore, there was a corporate belief, attributed to Lee Iacocca himself, of “safety doesn’t sell”. (2)

There was strong competition for Ford in the American small-car market from Volkswagen and several Japanese companies in the 1960’s. To fight the competition, Ford rushed its newest car the Pinto into production in much less time than is usually required to develop a car. The regular time to produce an automobile is 43 months but Ford took 25 months only (Satchi, L., 2005). Although Ford had access to a new design which would decrease the possibility of the Ford Pinto from exploding, the company chose not to implement the design, which would have cost $11 per car, even though it had done an analysis showing that the new design would result in 180 less deaths. The company defended itself on the grounds that